In the weakest states, African decision-makers have faced a choice between policy reforms and financial support by the I.F.I.s, on the one hand, and accelerated disintegration of the official economy and government apparatus, on the other. The former course may well lead to urban riots and other immediate threats to a leader's political life (at least). But the latter course may just as surely lead to an undermining of their position -e.g. the presidency -the understanding of which is shaped by roughly common international norms that are backed by external assistance incentives. These norms, made concrete by the operation of international agencies for finance and development, bring about a long-run convergence between the interests of African governments and the 'national interest', broadly construed as that which preserves and strengthens the state and the official economy. In the presence of these norms and incentives, it is not in the interests of an African president to allow the complete dissolution of the state.
This argument is illustrated below in an examination of policy In the weakest states, African decision-makers have faced a choice between policy reforms and financial support by the I.F.I.s, on the one hand, and accelerated disintegration of the official economy and government apparatus, on the other. The former course may well lead to urban riots and other immediate threats to a leader's political life (at least). But the latter course may just as surely lead to an undermining of their position -e.g. the presidency -the understanding of which is shaped by roughly common international norms that are backed by external assistance incentives. These norms, made concrete by the operation of international agencies for finance and development, bring about a long-run convergence between the interests of African governments and the 'national interest', broadly construed as that which preserves and strengthens the state and the official economy. In the presence of these norms and incentives, it is not in the interests of an African president to allow the complete dissolution of the state.
This argument is illustrated below in an examination of policy Sierra Leone is more the exception than the rule. In other weak states, the leaders have had a wider margin of autonomy in policymaking, and their choice of economic reforms has been more obviously connected with state-building goals. The widespread adoption of measures designed to liberalise economies in Africa should not be interpreted in every case as the result of either external coercion or temporarily expedient actions by 'patrimonial' rulers who cannot, in the long run, tolerate rationalisation. Reforms have been adopted in a number of countries because their governments have decided that these will make their economies stronger and more competitive -Ghana is the leading example. The experiences of the more successful African states are having an effect, as is the unusually high degree of consensus among experts about the defects of past economic policies, and the steps needed to correct them.
More commonly, reforms have been adopted by leaders attempting to put their authority on a firmer footing. This rationale also applies in Ghana, as it does in Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Benin, Guinea, and Togo. Rulers have used the reforms to undercut political rivals and/or to bring back under the purview of central government bureaucracy those parts of the economy lost to the black market, as well as the subsistence sector. Reforms have been pursued in Somalia in connection with state military goals, and in Tanzania and Zambia they have been adopted not simply because of external pressures, but also because their leaders have come to acknowledge, at least in part, the validity of donor criticisms of past economic policies. And almost everywhere rulers have used the reforms to replace 'old-style' politicians (mainly ethnic reforms in Sierra Leone, where the 'privatisation' of the state under the influence of kleptocratic forces proceeded to an extreme degree. When the new President, J. S. Momoh, assumed power in October I986, the choice before him was clear: undertake the basic reforms being pushed by the I.M.F., or let the official economy disappear and government institutions disintegrate entirely. The latter course was not feasible, given that both international actors and the Sierra Leonean elite assume that something resembling a modern state must continue to function. Under a different set of norms about what sort of political organisations should exist in the region, the semblance of the Sierra Leonean state might easily have passed away. For the 'worst case' states of sub-Saharan Africa, one can say that their regimes have been 'coerced' by the I.F.I.s into making economic reforms, but this interpretation remains superficial until the normative context is fully specified.
Sierra Leone is more the exception than the rule. In other weak states, the leaders have had a wider margin of autonomy in policymaking, and their choice of economic reforms has been more obviously connected with state-building goals. The widespread adoption of measures designed to liberalise economies in Africa should not be interpreted in every case as the result of either external coercion or temporarily expedient actions by 'patrimonial' rulers who cannot, in the long run, tolerate rationalisation. Reforms have been adopted in a number of countries because their governments have decided that these will make their economies stronger and more competitive -Ghana is the leading example. The experiences of the more successful African states are having an effect, as is the unusually high degree of consensus among experts about the defects of past economic policies, and the steps needed to correct them.
More commonly, reforms have been adopted by leaders attempting to put their authority on a firmer footing. This rationale also applies in Ghana, as it does in Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Benin, Guinea, and Togo. Rulers have used the reforms to undercut political rivals and/or to bring back under the purview of central government bureaucracy those parts of the economy lost to the black market, as well as the subsistence sector. Reforms have been pursued in Somalia in connection with state military goals, and in Tanzania and Zambia they have been adopted not simply because of external pressures, but also because their leaders have come to acknowledge, at least in part, the validity of donor criticisms of past economic policies. And almost everywhere rulers have used the reforms to replace 'old-style' politicians (mainly ethnic   II7 II7 II7 II7 leaders) with the rising generation of 35-45 year-old technocrats, who are becoming increasingly important in African politics.
I do not mean to exaggerate the amount or depth of the liberalising economic reforms that have taken place in Africa in the last few years.
Everywhere the process has been slowed by the interpenetration of elite interests in extensive black-market economies; by deteriorated central government bureaucracies, many of which are so weak that the notion of 'policy' or 'policy implementation' has become questionable; and by deep-seated doubts about the effectiveness of the new strategies. The point is simply that there is nothing intrinsic in African states, or in their international situation, that precludes behaviour in rough accord with the 'realist' assumptions. In fact, what is most interesting about such changes in economic policy is the light they shed on how the present international system influences the -definition of state 'interests'. In sub-Saharan Africa, realist behaviour has not sprung, fully formed, from the structural imperatives of the system; it has been helped along by international institutions charged with developing states in the western image, which presumes their sovereignty and competitive behaviour. The impact of the external shocks was greatly intensified, and recovery much hindered, by the effects of the economic policies being followed by many African states in the years leading up to the crisis. Over-valued exchange rates, marketing boards and systems that discouraged small-farmer production, and extremely inefficient, inward-looking parastatal sectors, made countries simultaneously more dependent on imports and less able to generate the export revenues needed to finance them. Sporadic commodity booms in the 1970s tended to encourage great increases in government spending, often wasted on large public investments that drained rather than generated The impact of the external shocks was greatly intensified, and recovery much hindered, by the effects of the economic policies being followed by many African states in the years leading up to the crisis. Over-valued exchange rates, marketing boards and systems that discouraged small-farmer production, and extremely inefficient, inward-looking parastatal sectors, made countries simultaneously more dependent on imports and less able to generate the export revenues needed to finance them. Sporadic commodity booms in the 1970s tended to encourage great increases in government spending, often wasted on large public investments that drained rather than generated The impact of the external shocks was greatly intensified, and recovery much hindered, by the effects of the economic policies being followed by many African states in the years leading up to the crisis. Over-valued exchange rates, marketing boards and systems that discouraged small-farmer production, and extremely inefficient, inward-looking parastatal sectors, made countries simultaneously more dependent on imports and less able to generate the export revenues needed to finance them. Sporadic commodity booms in the 1970s tended to encourage great increases in government spending, often wasted on large public investments that drained rather than generated A related development, not often noted in the standard accounts, concerns the disengagement of rural from urban-based economies in many African countries. By the early ig980os, peasants in the Central African Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia, and elsewhere, had greatly withdrawn from production for official market channels. Faced by institutional and policy disincentives, deteriorating infrastructures, and lack of attention to agriculture in official development plans, many peasants now grew crops for their own subsistence and nearby black markets. In Sierra Leone, Zaire, and Zambia, at least, the ambit of effective state influence shrank back to mineral and gem production. In Sierra Leone, as will be explored more fully below, the 'state' came to be little more than a group of powerful individuals fighting and colluding with each other for larger shares of the diamond trade. Capacity to generate and collect revenues weakened as state influence over the economy receded, and as corruption and black-market activity flourished. At the same time, the size of the public sector tended to increase, and with it, government expenditures.
In sum, the economic foundations of a number of African states were rapidly deteriorating when hit by the exogenous shocks of the early I98os. Those economies that were 'empirically' weak at independence had become even less viable, while some were pushed towards collapse. Leone, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia, and elsewhere, had greatly withdrawn from production for official market channels. Faced by institutional and policy disincentives, deteriorating infrastructures, and lack of attention to agriculture in official development plans, many peasants now grew crops for their own subsistence and nearby black markets. In Sierra Leone, Zaire, and Zambia, at least, the ambit of effective state influence shrank back to mineral and gem production. In Sierra Leone, as will be explored more fully below, the 'state' came to be little more than a group of powerful individuals fighting and colluding with each other for larger shares of the diamond trade. Capacity to generate and collect revenues weakened as state influence over the economy receded, and as corruption and black-market activity flourished. At the same time, the size of the public sector tended to increase, and with it, government expenditures.
In sum, the economic foundations of a number of African states were rapidly deteriorating when hit by the exogenous shocks of the early I98os. Those economies that were 'empirically' weak at independence had become even less viable, while some were pushed towards collapse. operations which they decried in public. The growth of 'parallel economies' in Africa resulted in part from increasingly widespread and severe distortions of domestic price systems, and a general increase in the use of controls on economic activity (often intended to stop the smuggling or diversions of production motivated by the former).
A related development, not often noted in the standard accounts, concerns the disengagement of rural from urban-based economies in many African countries. By the early ig980os, peasants in the Central African Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia, and elsewhere, had greatly withdrawn from production for official market channels. Faced by institutional and policy disincentives, deteriorating infrastructures, and lack of attention to agriculture in official development plans, many peasants now grew crops for their own subsistence and nearby black markets. In Sierra Leone, Zaire, and Zambia, at least, the ambit of effective state influence shrank back to mineral and gem production. In Sierra Leone, as will be explored more fully below, the 'state' came to be little more than a group of powerful individuals fighting and colluding with each other for larger shares of the diamond trade. Capacity to generate and collect revenues weakened as state influence over the economy receded, and as corruption and black-market activity flourished. At the same time, the size of the public sector tended to increase, and with it, government expenditures.
In sum, the economic foundations of a number of African states were rapidly deteriorating when hit by the exogenous shocks of the early I98os. Those economies that were 'empirically' weak at independence had become even less viable, while some were pushed towards We are now in a position to take up the 'coercion' interpretation of the policy changes -the argument that the liberalising economic reforms currently being implemented in Africa have resulted essentially from the ability of free-market-inclined I. Political and economic disintegration in Sierra Leone has many causes. As above, I would like to emphasise the critical role of price distortions and economic controls, particularly those concerning key goods, such as foreign exchange, agricultural production, petrol, and imported rice. By not responding to changed external economic conditions, and by adopting domestic controls to pursue policies that require more administrative capacity than exists, the Government creates incentives for producers to subvert or bypass legal regulations 1 'Rape', in Africa Confidential, 28 November I984, p. 3. Political and economic disintegration in Sierra Leone has many causes. As above, I would like to emphasise the critical role of price distortions and economic controls, particularly those concerning key goods, such as foreign exchange, agricultural production, petrol, and imported rice. By not responding to changed external economic conditions, and by adopting domestic controls to pursue policies that require more administrative capacity than exists, the Government creates incentives for producers to subvert or bypass legal regulations loc. cit. Political and economic disintegration in Sierra Leone has many causes. As above, I would like to emphasise the critical role of price distortions and economic controls, particularly those concerning key goods, such as foreign exchange, agricultural production, petrol, and imported rice. By not responding to changed external economic conditions, and by adopting domestic controls to pursue policies that require more administrative capacity than exists, the Government creates incentives for producers to subvert or bypass legal regulations 1 'Rape', in Africa Confidential, 28 November I984, p. 3. To a degree we should recognise this as well-intentioned rhetoric, and expect that 'patrimonial' features will sooner or later develop in force in the new regimes. But we should not discount the existence of these norms, and of a highly developed set of international institutions for finance and development geared to act on them. It is likely that the exchange rates of African currencies will increasingly come to reflect realistic values, and that in fewer countries will peasants be driven out of official channels by rapacious state-marketing boards.
African governments participate in the present international system, and in various ways accept its assumptions about states and their management -relatively willingly, as in Ghana, rather unwillingly, as in Sierra Leone, or almost entirely unwillingly, as in Zaire. The continuing economic-policy reforms in sub-Saharan countries should point us away from essentially cultural theories about the 'true nature' of African society and government, towards a broadened study of how state interests are determined throughout the continent.
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